Cloud computing is an emerging computing paradigm in which resources of the computing infrastructure are provided as outsourcing services through the Internet. With cloud computing technique, the users are able to outsource their computing and storage tasks to the cloud servers. In cloud computing environments, the user authentication is very important issue because it provides the authorization while users access their data and cloud services. In 2014, Chen et al. improved Choudhury et al.'s scheme, and claimed that their scheme is more secure and practical remote user authentication scheme for cloud computing. However, we find that Chen et al.'s scheme is still insecure against outsider attack, server impersonation attack, smart card stolen attack and off-line password guessing attack. To overcome this drawback, we propose a robust and more secure user authentication scheme. Finally, we show that our proposed scheme is more secure and supports security properties than Chen et al.'s scheme.
Introduction
Cloud Computing [1] is defined that refers to both the applications delivered as services via the Internet and the hardware and system software in the data center that provide those services. Thus, "cloud" can be defined a set of storages, services and interfaces those are provides by servers. Cloud computing allows users store and access all the data and services through the Internet instead of their own computers. The cloud computing can be categorized according to services available on the cloud namely IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), SaaS (Software as a Service) and PaaS (Platform as a Service) [2] . According to [3] , the security issues of cloud system can be classified into four categories: authentication, data integrity, data confidentiality and access control. Above all, the user authentication in cloud computing environments is very important issue because it provides the authorization while users access their data and cloud services. Since Lamport [4] proposed the first password-based authentication scheme over insecure communication in 1981, password-based authentication schemes [5] - [8] have been extensively investigated. However, a problem of password-based authentication scheme is that a server must maintain a password table for verifying the legitimacy of a remote user. Therefore, the server requires additional memory space for storing the password table for verifying user identity. Furthermore, password is generally simple and can be easily broken or forgotten. For this reason, many remote user authentication schemes using smart card [9] - [12] have been proposed. In 2011, Choudhury et al. [13] presented a user authentication frame for cloud computing. Choudhury et al. applies identity authentication with smart card for cloud computing. Their scheme verifies user authenticity using two-step verification, which is based on password, smart card and out of band authentication. However, in 2014, Chen et al. [14] 
Registration Phase
The registration phase is the initial phase of the scheme. In this phase, user provides appropriate identification details to the cloud server. Then the cloud server issues a smart card to user according user's data. 1) selects a random number x and computes 2) 3)
checks whether the has existed in server. 
Login Phase
This phase is invoked when user wants to login into cloud. To start any conversation, the user must first login to a specific terminal using smart card.
1)
inserts his smart card and inputs and .
2)
computes where denotes 's current timestamp. 3) .
Authentication Phase
After receiving the login request messages , the server verifies the identity of the user. The procedure is as follows. 
Password Change Phase
The phase is invoked when the user wants to change his/her password. 1) inserts his/her smart card into card-reader and inputs and .
2)
. and executes the login and authentication phase mentioned above. If passes the verification, will send a password change request to and then submit and where is ' n w p wo n is random number. 3) receiving password change request, checks and replaces it by . 4) . 5) n receiving response message, A checks . If it is correct, the smart card performs, 6) replaces by in the smart card.
Security Analysis of Chen et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we demonstrate the vulnerability of Chen et al.'s scheme in various communication scenarios.
Denial-of-Service via Wrong Password Login
This is the type of attack when a legal user is denied access to services which are meant for him. Suppose inserts wrong password in login phase. Smart card has no mechanism to detect it, then sends wrong login request as login request, when checks the equivalence . Clearly, it will not hold. As a result, will terminate the session and will face the DoS.
Outsider Attacks
Any adversary who is the legal user and owns a smart card can obtain information and then he/she can compute . If an adversary intercepts any user 's login request message and server 's response message , then he/she can compute the encryption key by calculating . Hence, adversary can decrypt server 's response message and compute the session key .
Server Impersonation Attacks
If user sends login request message to outsider adversary which impersonates as the server , then easily can compute by using . An adversary performs following step. 1) adversary generates a random number and computes and ) where is 's current timestamp. 2)
. After receiving response message from , will decrypt response message and check the timestamp and . However, is equal of . Therefore, an outsider adversary can impersonate the server .
Smart Card Stolen & Off-line Password Guessing Attacks
If an adversary intercepts legitimate user 's login request message and steals 's smart card, he/she can obtain parameters . Then, an adversary can perform off-line password guessing attacks. 1) n adversary guesses any password .
2)
n an adversary calculates and compares it with . If the result is equal to , the adversary infers that is user 's password. Otherwise the adversary selects another password nominee and performs the same processes, until he/she locates the valid password.
Requirement of Verifying Table
The server must maintain the verifying table that stores each user's and for verifying the legitimacy of the login users in Chen et al.'s proposed scheme. Therefore, the server requires extra memory space to store the verifying table. Although the one-way hash functions and encryption algorithms are applied to prevent the passwords from being disclosed, the verifying table is still vulnerable. Because any insider adversary who knows the server's secret key easily can impersonate any user by using and . Furthermore, if user wants to change his/her password, then server should replace to in verifying table.
Our Proposed Scheme
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In this section, we describe more secure remote user authentication. Our improved scheme consists of four phase and works as follows.
Registration Phase
The registration phase is operated when the user initially registers to the cloud server and is described as follows . 1) chooses his/her identity and password , then computes . 2)
. sends } to the server over a secure channel. 3) pon receiving registration request message from , generates and where is a random number to unique to . Then, computes, where is a large prime number and is a server 's secret number stored at the server.
4)
: a smart card. installs } in the smart card and sends the smart card to user via secure channel. . Smart card sends login request to through a common channel.
Login Phase
Authentication Phase
After receiving the login request message from , the server verifies the identity of the user . The procedure is as follows. 
Password Change Phase
If wants to change his/her password, he/she inserts his/her own smart card into a card reader, then enters identity and password . After receiving identity and password , smart card performs the following steps. 
Security Analysis of Our Proposed Scheme
In this section, we demonstrate that our scheme can withstand several possible attacks. We also show that our scheme supports several security properties. Our proposed scheme keeps the merits of Chen et al.'s scheme
Support User Anonymity
Suppose an adversary intercepts on user 's login request message. However, he/she fails to guess the user 's identity from . In our proposed scheme, we use random number which is the unique to user and the timestamp in the login phase, then user 's login request message is changed each login time. An adversary does not know and . Thus, our proposed scheme supports user anonymity.
Resisting Impersonation Attack
In the our proposed scheme, only can compute and since only he/she has the secrets and password and can compute and since only he/she has the secrets The authentication server authenticates by checking and the remote user authenticates by checking . Thus, our proposed scheme can resist impersonation attacks.
Resisting Smart Card Stolen Attack
If an adversary steals 's smart card, then can extract security parameters } from legitimate user 's smart card. However, this information does not help them. He/she cannot obtain any information of 's and because these values are protected by secret parameters. An identity in (= is protected by 's long-term secret key and the collision resistance one-way hash function , and a password in (= , (= ) is encrypted with . Therefore, the our proposed scheme can resist smart card stolen attack.
Resisting Replay Attacks
In the proposed authentication scheme, an adversary cannot correctly modifies and without and , where , and .
When and an adversary tries to use the previous message to login or to response , a failed adversary will be detected by checking the invalid timestamp and . Thus, the proposed authentication scheme is secure against the replay attack.
Comparison of Security Properties
We compare the proposed scheme with the scheme of Choudhury et al. [13] , Chen et al. [14] regarding resistance to possible attacks as depicted by Table 2 . Our proposed scheme resists all those attacks to which the previous schemes are susceptible. 
Conclusion
In 2014, Chen et al. proposed an enhanced scheme of Choudhury et al.'s scheme and demonstrated it is resistance to famous attacks such as impersonation attacks and out of band attacks. However, Chen et al.'s scheme is still insecure. Furthermore, their scheme has no wrong password detection mechanism then may deduce the DoS problem. In this paper, we shown how their scheme can suffer from outsider attacks, server impersonation attacks and smart card stolen attacks and proposed an improved protocol for authentication scheme that keeps the similar properties of Chen et al.'s scheme and make it more secure. The security analysis explains that our improved scheme rectifies the vulnerabilities of Chen et al.'s scheme.
